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ORGANIZING THEMES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
by MARCIA R. GELPEt 
INTRODUCTION 
Environmental law is a new, far-reaching and difficult field. 
Highly statutory, it involves many complex federal and state 
statutes and even more complex regulations at both levels. 
Many lawyers now in practice did not study environmental law 
in law school. 1 They have entered the field because of their 
own interests and because of client needs. Even newer law-
yers, who took courses in environmental law, probably saw 
only a small part of the field in their studies.2 The demands of 
their practice probably ask them to go far beyond the limits of 
their training. Finally, environmental law is still young and 
changes with almost every legislative session. In short, it is a 
hard field to understand completely. 
This article is designed to assist two groups of lawyers in 
their work in this field. First, it is addressed to lawyers who 
practice in one area of environmental law. These lawyers need 
to know how the areas in which they work relate to the other 
areas of environmental law, because their work in one area af-
fects clients' interests in another area. Also, specialists in envi-
ronmental law are often pushed by their clients' needs to 
expand their areas of environmental practice. Second, this ar-
ticle is addressed to lawyers who have not practiced environ-
mental law, but who are moving into the area. In addition, the 
article is addressed to students, and most particularly to my 
students, whose need to understand how things fit together 
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The author and the Law 
Review have agreed to share a joint copyright in this article. 
1. In fact, the author, who received her law degree in 1974, had no course in 
Environmental Law. The closest was an excellent course in Water Resources Man-
agement at Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, taught by Professor A. 
Dan Tarlock, now Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
2. One of my recurring frustrations as a teacher is deciding what to teach in my 
Environmental Regulation course and how to approach the subject, since I must 
leave out far more topics than I can include. 
897 
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has led me to develop this overview of my favorite area of the 
law. 
A lawyer or student who is examining an unfamiliar statute 
needs to identify the approach the statute takes to the problem 
of limiting pollution. This will tell the lawyer the main issues 
to watch for and what features to expect in the statute. Most 
important, it will give the lawyer an orientation to an otherwise 
almost impossibly complex set of statutory provisions. 
Environmental law, as I use the term here, is the law on 
preventing and mitigating the effects of pollution. I exclude 
natural resources law, which is closely related but more di-
rectly addresses management of resources such as forests, min-
eral deposits, wildlife, oil and gas. Modem environmental law 
is usually dated from 1969, when the federal government en-
acted the National Environmental Policy Act.3 That statute 
was followed by the other main federal statutes, including but 
not limited to: the Clean Air Act (CAA);4 the Clean Water Act 
(CWA);5 the Fe~eral Fungicide, Insecticide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FIFRA);6 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA);7 the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA);8 and the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund).9 States, including Min-
nesota, have enacted their own comparable statutes. 
This article begins with the origins of modem environmental 
law. It briefly summarizes the reasons we have environmental 
problems and describes the inadequacies of the common law 
responses. This is key to understanding the rest of the article, 
for modem environmental statutes are designed to remedy the 
shortcomings of the common law. The main part of the article 
sets out the various approaches to remedying those shortcom-
ings and gives examples of environmental statutes which take 
each of these approaches. 
REASONS FOR POLLUTION 
There are two basic reasons for pollution. Many more are 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982). 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & West Supp. 1990). 
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). 
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988). 
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
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discussed in the literature, but they generally relate to these 
two basic causes. First, pollution is a classic externalities prob-
lem .. The people who produce pollution do not have to bear 
the full cost of the harm it produces. Therefore, they produce 
more than they would if they incurred all the harm themselves. 
Second, sometimes even those who bear the harm of pollution 
do not recognize its cost, due to deficits in inforniation, so they 
do not make informed choices about how much pollution to 
produce or to tolerate. 
Our common law tort system, which we use in many situa-
tions to assign liability to those who cause harm, works poorly 
in the environmental area. It was not designed to handle the 
type of long term, subtle effects that many environmental con-
taminants cause. The tort system deals mainly with single 
event accidents with acute effects. In addition, the tort system 
is hungry for information. It. depends on good evidence and 
proof to meet at least the preponderance of evidence standard. 
This system does not work well to resolve disputes, assign lia-
bility, and govern behavior where information is limited. 
REGULATORY STANDARDS 
"Command and control" regulations are the most common 
form of environmental laws. In these laws the government de-
cides how much discharge is tolerable and requires facilities to 
limit their discharges to that amount. The idea is quite simple. 
Its implementation is not. 
First, the government must decide how much discharge to 
allow. Second, it must express the discharge limit in a way that 
is meaningful to the type of activity being regulated. Third, it 
must enforce the discharge limit. 
The government has three basic ways to decide how much 
discharge to allow. 1O The most obvious way is to do what the 
market would do ifit functioned properly. That is: I) identify 
the adverse effects caused by the discharge, 2) identify the 
costs of controlling the discharge, and then 3) limit discharges 
10. The analysis of how to decide how much discharge to allow was first devel-
oped for a long paper on the subject which will appear in Gelpe, Deciding How Much to 
Spend on Environmental Regulation, MECHKAREI MISHPAT (Spring 1990) (publication of 
Bar Han University, Ramat Gan, Israel) (in press). For the English reader, a shorter 
version, that is still more detailed than the discussion in the present article, was pub-
lished in Gelpe, Environmental OJiality: Three Ways to Decide How Much to Spend, 8 WM. 
MITCHELL MAG. 35 (Fall 1989). 
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to the level at which the costs of further control exceed the 
value of further reducing the adverse effects.u Usually the 
costs of control rise with more stringent limitations while the 
adverse impacts of pollution fall. Assuming that the adverse 
impacts of uncontrolled pollution exceed the costs of some ini-
tial level of control, at some point the control costs will begin 
to exceed the value of the adverse impacts. That level would 
be set as the discharge limitation. 
These standards, called cost-benefit standards, while simple 
in theory have proved extremely difficult in practice. Identify-
ing all control costs is very difficult, identifying all environmen-
tal effects is even worse, and balancing one against the other is 
hardest of all. This is not just a matter of comparing apples 
and oranges; it requires comparing dollars and health. Some 
statutes seem to require this approach. For example, the fed-
eral Environmental Protection Agency must determine that a 
pesticide "will not generally cause unreasonable adverse ef-
fects on the environment" before it allows use of that pesti-
cide. 12 The word "unreasonable" seems to call for a cost-
benefit analysis. More frequently, both legislatures and agen-
cies have shied from the task, unwilling to face political and 
judicial review of decisions based on cost-benefit analysis. 
A second way to set command and control standards is to 
decide what environmental effects should be avoided on some 
basis independent of the cost of eliminating them, and then 
simply dictate that discharges be reduced to the level where 
such environmental impacts will not occur. For example, the 
legislature can decide to protect public health and dictate that 
standards be written to limit emissions to those levels which 
will have no adverse impacts on public health. 
11. In theory, identification of both adverse effects of pollution, which when 
eliminated will become benefits of pollution control, and control costs could include 
fairness as well as m!lnetary costs. That is, they could include distributional con-
cerns. For example, the fact that inner city residents breathe lead so that suburban-
dwelling workers can drive to their jobs is an adverse distributional effect independ-
ent of and in addition to the adverse health impacts ofthe lead in the auto emissions. 
Similarly, controlling pollution by cutting back factory production has adverse im-
pacts on workers for the benefit of downwind residents, and imposes a distributional 
effect to the extent that the workers and the residents are different people. 
In reality, such distributional effects are rarely considered for either theoretical 
or practical reasons. A Cost-benefit analysis usually compares the benefits of pollu-
tion control, on whomever they fall, with the costs, to whomever pays them. 
12. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, § 3(b)(5), 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136a(b)(5) (1988). 
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Congress has used this approach several times, requiring 
what are commonly referred to as health-based or environ-
ment-based standards. The Clean Air Act provisions on regu-
lation of hazardous air pollutants require that standards be set 
at the level which "provides an ample margin of safety to pro-
tect the public health."13 While such standards have a fine 
protectionist sound, they do not work very well in practice. 14 
The difficulty is in determining the environmental effects of 
each discharge. In the absence of good information on the dis-
charge-effect relationship, and for most pollutants good infor-
mation is absent, the only way to really protect the 
environment is to forbid all discharges. But zero-discharge 
standards would impose enormous costs on industry and crip-
ple our economy. 
Moreover, even when good information on the discharge-
effect relationship is available, it is hard to use. What, for ex-
ample, is meant by a requirement to protect the public health? 
Does this require protection of only the majority of the public? 
Certainly not. Some members of the public are more suscepti-
ble to environmental pollutants than others. For example, 
children under four are more susceptible to mental impair-
ment from lead ingestion and inhalation. People with asthma 
are more susceptible to breathing difficulties from exposure to 
sulfur dioxide in the air. Clearly we should not set standards 
that ignore the needs of all children under the age of four, but 
what of the asthmatics? And if people with asthma are to be 
protected, what of the smaller number of people with rarer 
medical conditions even more sensitive to environmental pol-
lutants? If costs are not a factor in deciding permissible dis-
13. Clean Air Act, § 112(b)(I)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(I)(8) (1982). This lan-
guage was interpreted in Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States EPA, 
824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
The Clean Water Act gives the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency discretion, under certain circumstances, to set standards for toxic water pol-
lutants which "take into account the toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence, 
degradability, the usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in any waters, 
the importance of the affected organisms and the nature and extent of the effect of 
the toxic pollutant on such organisms, and the extent to which effective control is 
being or may be achieved under other regulatory authority." Clean Water Act 
§ 307(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1988). This language, which has not been ad-
dressed by any court, seems to call for environment-based standards. 
14. Part of the lengthy history ofregulatory failure under the Clean Air Act pro-
vision quoted in the text is described in Natural Resources Defense Council v. United 
States EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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charge levels, how can we draw any line short of one which 
protects everyone? 
While health-based and environment-based standards have 
proved attractive to legislators, who can boast that they voted 
to protect the public, whatever the cost, they have proved 
enormously troublesome in practice. Regulatory agencies 
have been unable or unwilling to enact such standards, con-
cerned on the one hand with imposing the enormous costs of 
zero-discharge standards and on the other hand with finding 
anything short of zero-discharge that is both honest and capa-
ble of surviving the rulemaking process and judicial review. 
A third type of standard is called a technology-based stan-
dard. In this type of standard, the discharge limitation is set at 
a level that will result if the discharging facility uses the best 
pollution control technology that is available. These standards 
have little solid intellectual underpinning, but they appeal to 
the "let's do the best we can without upsetting things too 
. much" school of common sense, and they are workable. Agen-
cies can pretty well identify what types of pollution control are 
available and how much control they will provide. While there 
are still disputes over whether certain technology works and 
how well it works, the disputes are of a more manageable di-
mension than with other types of standards. Technology-
based standards are perhaps the most common ones in our en-
vironmental laws. Two examples are standards for new 
sources under the Clean Air Act15 and most effluent limitations 
under the Clean Water Act. 16 
Whatever mechanism the government uses to set command 
and control standards, these standards can take three different 
forms. The most common is an emission standard, also called 
an emission limitation or an effluent limitation. This is a limit 
on the amount of pollutant that may be discharged from a pipe 
or stack. A facility that emits more than the allowed amount is 
subject to enforcement action. Most limits in permits issued 
under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and their state 
counterparts are emission limitations. 
A second, also common, form of standard is the work prac-
tice or equipment standard. Instead of stating how much of a 
pollutant a facility may discharge, this type of standard speci-
15. Clean Air Act § I 11 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (1982). 
16. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988). 
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fies what steps facility operators must observe to reduce dis-
charges. For example, contractors who are demolishing 
buildings containing certain types of asbestos insulation must 
wet the asbestos-containing building parts while they are being 
demolished. 17 The government dictates work practice or 
equipment standards when it is impractical to set emission 
standards because of limits on the ability to measure emis-
sions, or because measurement is not practical. Work practice 
and equipment standards are also common in air and water 
permits, although less common than emission limitations. 
A third kind of standard is the ambient standard. This is a 
standard limiting the concentration of a pollutant in the envi-
ronment. Generally, such standards are used as goals or de-
vices to measure the success of other environmental controls. 
For example, the Clean Air Act requires the Administrator of 
the Environmental Protection Agency to set national ambient 
air quality standards, which state permissible levels of air 
pollutants in the air people breathe. 18 States then design plans 
that limit emissions sufficiently to meet these ambient 
standards. 19 
For practical reasons, ambient standards are usually not di-
rectly enforceable. Many sources may contribute to general 
ambient levels· of a pollutant, and assigning responsibility to 
one source or another is too uncertain to form the basis for 
enforcement. In some cases, involving rare chemicals, ambient 
levels may be linked to one source's discharges and may be the 
basis for enforcement action. 
Command and control standards are enforced through an 
elaborate system that involves all or some of the following: ad-
ministrative authority to issue compliance orders or impose 
civil penalties; authorization for the government to seek judi-
cial remedies of injunctions and compliance orders, civil penal-
ties, and criminal fines andjail sentences; and authorization for 
citizens to seek injunctions, compliance orders and civil penal-
ties in courts. 
17. 40 C.F.R. § 61.147 (1989). 
18. Clean Air Act § 109(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a), (b) (1982). 
19. Clean Air Act § llO(a)(l), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 741O(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) (1982). 
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PAYMENT 
A few environmental statutes use payments to limit pollutant 
discharges. That is, the discharger is simply paid to reduce or 
eliminate the discharges. 
Payment statutes are usually used in three circumstances: 
when it appears that the party responsible for the discharge is 
financially incapable of reducing the discharge or mitigating its 
effects, when it seems unfair to require the discharging party to 
bear the cost of discharge reduction and mitigation, or when 
some other public good can be gained from spending public 
money on discharge reduction and mitigation. In some cases, 
more than one of these situations co-exist. 
The Minnesota Waste Tire Program pays owners of tire 
dumps to take waste tires to tire processing facilities.20 The 
legislature was apparently concerned that many owners of tire 
piles would be financially unable to remove the tires, and the 
tire piles would be breeding grounds for mosquitoes and pose 
the risk of serious fires, which are difficult to extinguish. In 
another state payment program, under the Minnesota Petro-
leum Tank Release Cleanup Act, the state pays most of the 
costs incurred by a person who cleans up a release from a leak-
ing petroleum tank.21 
The federal grants program under the Clean Water Act, 
which began in 1972 and is now being phased out,22 is a good 
example of a payment program that was probably designed at 
least in part to obtain another public good; that is, one other 
than discharge reduction. This program has been viewed as a 
public works program as well as part of a pollution control 
plan.23 
CHARGES 
An almost opposite approach to pollution problems is to 
charge dischargers. Firms that discharge pollutants must pay 
in order to be able to continue discharging. 
The laws actually reveal two quite different sets of charge 
schemes. Although they tend to look similar in that in both 
20. MINN. R. § 9220.0170 (1989). 
21. MINN. STAT. § 115C.09 (Supp. 1989). 
22. Clean Water Act § 205, 33 U.S.C. § 1285 (1988). 
23. See Gelpe, Pollution Control Laws Against Public Facilities, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 69, 77 (1989). 
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cases, the polluter pays, their underlying rationales and there-
fore some of their practical features are quite different. 
The first is what I will call the "pure charge scheme." Pollu-
tion imposes costs on others. Our property and economic sys-
tems fail to make the polluter pay these costs, so the polluter is 
free to disregard them in deciding how much goods to pro-
duce and how to produce them. Therefore, polluters make de-
cisions causing pollution which they would not make if they 
had to pay the full costs of their pollution. 
A pure charge scheme is theoretically very simple. It 
charges the polluter for the costs it imposes on others. This 
simply corrects the defects in the property and economic sys-
tems by substituting a charge imposed by government instead 
of by private systems. 
A pure charge system is practically impossible. I know of no 
complete pure charge system. In order to have a pure charge 
system, the government must know what pollution a firm is dis-
charging and what environmental effects that pollution causes. 
The government must also be able to put a monetary value on 
those effects. For reasons already discussed, the government 
never has this much information. Furthermore, in a pure 
charge scheme, each time the firm changed its discharges, for 
example by lowering them in order to avoid part of the 
charges, the environmental effects would have to be reconsid-
ered and revalued. This requires more information than we 
have and is so complex that the administrative costs are 
prohibitive. 
Nonetheless, there are some partial pure charge schemes. 
These are schemes predicated on the rationale of charging 
back part of the environmental costs of firms' discharges. The 
schemes differ in which costs they charge back and in how 
closely they require that the costs charged be associated with a 
firm's activities. 
The Minnesota permit fees are one example of a partial pure 
charge scheme. One cost of discharging is the public cost of 
regulating the discharges. Part of that public cost is the cost to 
the state for writing discharge permits and enforcing these per-
mits. Under Minnesota law, firms that have permits for air or 
water discharges, or that handle hazardous wastes, must pay 
permit fees that cover the costs of permit writing and 
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enforcement. 24 
This is far from a complete or pure charge scheme. Only 
public regulatory costs are charged, and then only some of 
those costs. The costs of developing the regulatory programs, 
for example, are not included. Moreover, the relationship be-
tween the costs caused by an individual source and the amount 
it must pay is loose. Sources are grouped by total amount of 
pollutants discharged, and not cost of permit development and 
enforcement. In general, it is costlier to write permits for 
sources that discharge a lot of pollutants, so there is a valid 
relationship between the charge and the effect. But on a finer 
level, some large volume dischargers are more easily and 
cheaply regulated than others, and the charge scheme does not 
distinguish between them. There is good reason for the failure 
to distinguish; the administrative costs of assigning the pre-
cisely correct charge to each source would be prohibitive. 
Other charge schemes have an even looser association be-
tween the amount of the charge and the environmental effects. 
Under the federal Superfund law, those who manufacture, pro-
duce or import certain chemicals must pay a tax based on the 
weight of the chemicals they sell.25 The money collected is 
used, along with other funds, to clean up hazardous waste 
sites.26 While this tax imposes part of the cost of cleaning up 
chemical spills on those who initially benefit from the sale of 
similar chemicals, it makes no effort to distinguish between 
producers whose products are carefully handled and not 
spilled and those who knowingly sell to firms that mishandle 
and spill the product. Moreover, today's producers are being 
charged on the basis of current production for yesterday'S 
spills, although it is obvious that current production does not 
cause the environmental harm for which the charge is 
compensating. 
This brings us to the second type of charge scheme, which I 
will call a regulatory charge scheme. Some charge schemes are 
designed mainly to increase the cost of discharging, as a way of 
encouraging firms to reduce their discharges. By making it 
24. MINN. R. ch. 7002 (1989) (air and water permit fees) and MINN. R. 
§ 7046.0020 (1989) (hazardous waste permit fees). 
25. 26 U.S.C. § 4661(a), (b) (1988). 
26. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
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more expensive to discharge, government works to have dis-
charges reduced without the elaborate government rulemak-
ing, permitting and enforcement mechanism that accompanies 
regulatory schemes. The theory is that it is easier to calculate 
charges that will lead to a desired level of discharge reduction 
than it is to devise regulations to accomplish the same goal. 
The premises are: 1) if the amount of discharge reduction that 
a scheme will yield is miscalculated or if the government, based 
on new information or new choices about how clean to make 
the environment, changes the goal, it is easier to adjust a 
charge scheme than a regulatory scheme; and 2) it is easier to 
collect charges from firms accustomed to making regularized 
payments in other contexts, such as taxes, than it is to enforce 
regulatory standards. 
Despite considerable advocacy of such charge schemes in 
the literature, and the greater simplicity as compared to pure 
charge schemes, these charges have not been used extensively. 
The Superfund tax, described above, has some aspects of a 
charge scheme of this type. One of the effects of the tax is to 
encourage chemical feedstock manufacturers to reduce their 
production of those chemicals subject to taxation. Still, none 
of the major environmental statutes now on the books is really 
designed as a regulatory charge scheme. But the considerable 
attention such charges have obtained in the literature, and the 
growing dissatisfaction with the costs and complexity of tradi-
tional regulatory statutes, suggest that regulatory charge 
schemes will be enacted in the future. 27 
CHANGES IN COMMON LAw 
The environmental statutes discussed thus far supplement 
common law mechanisms by providing new and different 
mechanisms for pollution control. They are designed to sur-
mount common law shortcomings by replacing the common 
law with new statutory schemes. Other environmental statutes 
are designed to cure common law shortcomings. These stat-
utes focus on one or more of the features of the common law 
that makes it of limited utility in controlling pollution and al-
27. The California legislature is now considering a plan to rebate state sales 
taxes on low polluting cars and impose a surcharge on high polluting cars. Wall St. 
j., May 7,1990, at 81, col. 3. 
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ters that feature of the common law by statute. Some of the 
statutory alterations are simple; others are elaborate. 
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA),28 and 
similar legislation in other states, take aim at a peculiar short-
coming in the common law that was not mentioned above; that 
is the difficulty of a private individual bringing a public nui-
sance action under common law. The usual rule is that a plain-
tiff who suffers the same type of harm as other members of the 
public may not bring a public nuisance action. MERA and 
other similar statutes give members of the public standing to 
bring such actions.29 This makes public nuisance law a better 
tool for pursuing polluters. 
The Superfund laws also are designed in part to alter com-
mon law actions. One of the basic difficulties of using the com-
mon law to clean up hazardous waste sites was the necessity to 
litigate first. A court could order that a site be cleaned up only 
after an often difficult determination of who was responsible 
for the waste at the site. While the judicial process was ongo-
ing, wastes would continue to leak and the problem got worse. 
One of the basic features of the Superfund laws is to provide a 
mechanism for the state to clean up first and then litigate liabil-
ity later.3o While the laws contain a number of related, com-
plex features, the underlying philosophy is to alter the 
common law. The Superfund laws are basically common law 
variants in other ways, as well. For example, they provide 
strict, joint and several liability for clean up costs,31 thus bypas-
sing the need for a court to determine whether application of 
strict, joint and several liability is appropriate. 
CHANGES IN MARKET MECHANISMS 
Some statutes, instead of changing how the common law 
works, change the conditions in which the law operates. For 
example, one of the reasons that environmental problems arise 
is that information on environmental effects of pollutants is 
28. MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.OI-.13 (1988). 
29. The Minnesota provision is MINN. STAT. § 1l6B.03, subd. I (1988). 
30. See MINN. STAT. § 1l5B.17,subds.I,6(1988);seeaisoCERCLA§§ 104(a)(I), 
107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(I), 9607(a) (Supp. V 1987). 
31. The state statute is explicit on this matter; the federal statute is not. For two 
of the numerous cases interpreting the federal provision, see O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 
F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989) and City of Philadelphia v. Stephen Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 
1l35, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
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hard to obtain. Several laws are designed to produce more in-
formation, putting the burden of information production on 
the firm producing the pollutant. With the information pro-
vided, both litigation and regulation are easier. More than 
that, development of the required information also reduces the 
externalities problem. Once a firm sees the new information 
that the law has forced it to develop, the firm itself will have a 
greater understanding of the environmental effects of its activi-
ties and its potential liabilities. This provides an incentive to 
reduce pollution without either litigation or regulation. 
An example is found in the community right-to-know provi-
sions of SARA.32 Certain companies that manufacture, pro-
cess or use toxic chemicals must report the nature and amount 
of such chemicals33 to the government and to the public.34 
Another type of legal change attacks a different underlying 
problem. One reason firms have little incentive to reduce pol-
lution absent pollution control laws is that the firms gain little 
or no benefit from the substantial expenditures often required 
for pollution reduction. Because the adverse environmental 
effects are externalities, a firm does not capture the benefit of 
reducing the effects. Some laws, still in a rudimentary state, 
are designed to allow the firms to reap some of the benefits of 
their pollution reduction efforts. These laws give a firm that 
has reduced emissions a type of property right in the reduc-
tion. A firm that has reduced emissions can save this property 
right for future use or sell it to others. 
The Environmental Protection Agency has established a 
mechanism for saving and selling this type of right in its Emis-
sions Trading Policy Statement under the Clean Air Act. 35 
These provisions are still weak in several ways. The fact that 
future changes in the law can wipe out saved rights reduces the 
value of these rights. Also, the trading of the rights has been 
heavily regulated, in part because pollution at the site where it 
was reduced may not be equivalent to pollution at the site 
where it is to be used.36 Still, the concept is intriguing and may 
32. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001-50 (Supp. V 1987) (enacted as and commonly refered to as SARA Title III 
(Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act Title III)). 
33. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (Supp. V 1987). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 11044 (Supp. V 1987). 
35. 47 Fed. Reg. 15,075 (Apr. 7, 1982). 
36. See 47 Fed. Reg. 15,082 (Apr. 7, 1982). 
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provide the basis for future developments. 
PLANNING 
One of the long standing mechanisms for controlling pollu-
tion problems has been to prevent them by prior planning. 
The zoning laws stem in part from a desire to prevent nui-
sances from occurring by separating incompatible land uses. 
Modern environmental laws have pursued this theme of pollu-
tion prevention through planning. 
The National Environmental Policy Act37 is the oldest of the 
current generation of environmental statutes. It is an excellent 
example of a law designed as a planning tool. The basic phi-
losophy of the law, and comparable state laws,38 is that govern-
ment agencies should identify and consider the environmental 
effects of their activities before they undertake them. The Min-
nesota statutes on county solid waste planning39 are. another 
example of planning laws. 
One general difficulty with planning laws is that they may 
not prevent pollution problems. The provisions in the laws for 
enforcement of environmental perogatives are typically weak. 
Planning laws generally depend on the philosophy that if envi-
ronmental problems are identified, people will work to miti-
gate them. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has set out an overview of the environmental 
statutes. It concentrates on the differing approaches used by 
the various statutes. With this overview in mind, a practicing 
lawyer should be able to more easily understand a statutory 
provision that is new to the lawyer and see how various provi-
sions relate to each other. 
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982). 
38. E.g., Minnesota State Environmental Policy Act, MINN. STAT. 
§§ 116D.OI-.07 (1988). 
39. MINN. STAT. § 1l5A.42-.46 (1988). 
